Currently users vote on all matters.
But I’ve been reviewing how we can continue to have technology that matches our values to better create processes that keep Bao secure and decentralized and encourage other participants.
For this I am proposing a governance and process megabill that will:
- Further decentralize decision making.
- Define clear contributor processes.
- Rework the management of the treasuries.
- Clearly define properties ownership within the DAO.
- Clearly define governance process within the DAO.
- Kick off phase 2 of our roadmap.
From the point of this governance vote passing, we’d have an aim of integrating each of these changes within a 3 month time period.
For this reason, some elements are clearly defined with preset structure, and others are just commitments for us to work with the stakeholders to define and implement that process within that time period.
Section #1: Defining Roles
The DAO shall consist of ‘members’ who are Bao token holders. The members proportionally vote on the decisions for Bao.
Due to the logistic challenges of having members vote on every small decision, the members will in turn vote in a ‘core team’.
The core team will act as an elected management for the project, serving for a period of two-years or until recall by the DAO.
Their goal is to:
- With the feedback and involvement of the DAO, set a product direction and plan. The core team is not defining the product direction, but acting as a curator to organize, vet and clarify the ambitions of the DAO.
- Create and maintain a clear and secure process for contributing to the Bao products via open source.
- Managing and maintaining core infrastructure that can not be directly held by the DAO (such as domain names, servers, logos and trademarks)
- Reporting on the DAO’s treasury budget.
- Managing other team members that the DAO has hired.
- Bringing forward established binding proposals to the core voting section of Bao’s Snapshot voting.
- Holding a veto authority over community votes that they feel are detrimental or damaging to the community (can be over-turned by a 2/3rds majority vote with a >30% quorum)
- Being multisig holders for the deployer and treasury wallets.
The Community team shall report into the core team. The DAO shall vote in by core proposal a head of community management and operations on a yearly cycle or until recall, or dismissal by the core team.
The team shall also consist of volunteer or compensated Community Managers who help to manage the various social assets (such as the Discord, Docs and Forums) for Bao.
The goal of these individuals are to:
- Maintain the social channels in an orderly and helpful fashion.
- Establish and maintain avenues of support for using Bao’s products.
- Establish, keep and maintain up to date documentation that supports Bao users.
- Create and deploy information and content that helps users learn about Bao.
- Support in managing governance and contributor workflows where applicable.
- Enforcing community rules and orderly governance.
To ensure decentralization, these roles are their own separate entity from the Bao core team. While the core team can remove the head of community/operations, they do not have the ability to directly remove Community Managers. It must be done by vote between the core team and the head of community; and while the core team can remove the head of community, they cannot replace a new one without a broad vote.
The members of this team are not given privileged development information except in rare cases where it is required to do their jobs (such as using an alpha product to create documentation).
BaoFriend is an unofficial rank given to contributors within the Discord and community.
These individuals are ones who have demonstrated they are helpful contributors to the Bao community at broad either in their support of the community or in their technical contributions.
They serve in this role by vote of the core team, the community managers and the head of community/operations. The expectations for their role vary, but they often hold this role so long as they remain active, set a good standard for community behavior and continue to contribute to the product.
Given their arms-length role and lack of compensation. They are able to neutrally serve as a multisig holder.
External teams are any team, individuals, or entities that have put forward a budget or build proposal and been approved to work on developing Bao in exchange for payment or bounty.
These teams do not have decision authority of any type. They serve at the pleasure of the DAO. Their day to day operations can be overseen and reviewed by the core team, who has the ability to pause their work and bring forward a community vote to end the agreement if they feel there is an issue.
It is possible for external teams to create a positive and long-lasting/recurring relationship with the DAO where they become a primary services provider. While this is allowed, the core team should take measures to ensure that there are clear transition and contingency plans for the assets developed and maintained by these teams, so that no critical components can be used to hold the DAO hostage to an external entity.
All products external teams deploy should be governed by the DAO and a multisig wallet.
Small features and contributions are not eligible for development bounties and should be built out by contributors. The goal of allowing external teams is to allow an avenue for compensating entire development teams to build out robust extensive product features (or new products) in the Bao ecosystem.
Contributors are what make up the bulk of Bao. Volunteer contributors, both who contribute to the code through Github, but also to governance and product decisions in the governance forum.
These individuals do not get paid for their work but instead are a critical component of building Bao which rewards them for their efforts through the growth and adoption of the product.
In cases of exceptional consistent and on-going contribution, the core team may choose to provide a bounty to some contributors from the community fund.
Section #2: Securing Decentralization
To secure our decentralization the Bao DAO will seek to:
- A) Establish two multisig wallets.
One multisig wallet will consist of 4 members of current teams (2 core team members, 1 head of operations/community, 1 community manager) this operations wallet will manage the deployer addresses to the timelock and require 3/4 signatures to deploy.
The second multisig wallet will consist of 8 members. (2 core team members, 1 head of operations/community, 1 community manager, 2 baofriends, and 2 external signers) it will require 5/8 signers for a transaction to go through. This will be our treasury management wallet.
To establish these wallets we’ll use a Gnosis Safe, and we’ll be able to implement these wallets on both xDAI and mainnet.
B) We will move all current treasury addresses in the contracts to point to the Gnosis Treasury Safe, so all future Bao printed for those treasuries is printed there. This will exclude the founder treasury share.
C) We will end the founder treasury share on xDAI and Mainnet. Lowering the total future printing of Bao.
D) We will move all the current $BAO in the treasury wallets over to the Gnosis Treasury Safes, excluding the founder treasury share and assets that cover bounties, payments, fees or pre-determined salaries for a two-year period as established in previous governance votes.
E) We will establish and update clear governance voting guidelines (outlined below).
F) We will begin to onboard additional code reviewers from our technical community, and set up our Github PRs to allow a multisig style review process. To begin only the core team will have merge and deploy access, but we will work to expand this over time when the community has trusted technical stakeholders.
G) We will create a formalized grant process that will allow external teams to put forward proposals to be paid for developing part of Bao.
H) This configuration will last until the community is confident that the new Gnosis Snapshot integration is ready for direct DAO management.
Section #3: Voting
Until such a time that it is feasible to implement a fully technical on-chain DAO solution without gas issues, our voting shall take place on the established Snapshot page on mainnet.
The core team shall administrate the voting site.
Any one with >0.25% of voting authority may put forward a community proposal. These votes are considered directional but non-binding.
Any one with >1% of the total voting authority, or the core team may sponsor a proposal to become a core proposal. That proposal shall be considered binding.
To become a core proposal it must either:
A) Have been deemed urgent and critical by the core team.
B) Have spent at least 1 week in the “Concepts” section for feedback, then at least 1 week in the “Governance Proposals” section of the forum with its final wording before moving to a vote. The vote in this case may last no less than 1 week.
For a vote to pass it must have at least a 51% majority, and a quorum of 5% of total voting power.
For a vote to pass in a case where it will recall a team member or override a veto power, it must have a 2/3rds majority and a quorum of at least 20% of total voting power.
New proposals may be considered to overwrite previous approvals.
In the case of Bao voting on governance related to franchises, the vote shall be non-proportional. If the Bao community were to vote on a Yes/No question related to Yetiswap, and “Yes” got 51% of the vote, then 100% of the votes held by the Bao Community will vote Yes on yeti governance.
Section #4: Asset Clarity
Currently the Bao community owns Baoswap and the Bao farms on mainnet and xDAI.
With this vote, Yetiswap and Pandaswap would become official assets of the Bao family to be deployed over the coming months.
Other than these assets and the Bao in the vault, the Bao community will have to vote to officially absorb future assets as they appear. Until then they are the property of their creators.
This is to prevent contributors from creating assets that could be legally problematic for the DAO. As the DAO will have to specifically approve and accept an asset before it is considered their property.
These assets along with those outlined in the treasury section constitute the full extensive property of the DAO.
Section #5: Deploy and Activate Staking + Fees on Baoswap
This section votes to move Baoswap out of alpha.
It will deploy and activate an xBAO staking model (based 100% on the xSUSHI staking model) and deploy that to xDAI.
It will also deploy and activate a staking model called tBAO on mainnet after the deployment of Yetiswap and Pandaswap. The fee collection from Yetiswap and Pandaswap will be moved to the mainnet across trustless bridges and will be used for the tBAO staking.
Section #6: Treasury Management
To clean up the treasury management, we will:
Move all treasury Bao, excluding founder share, to the new Gnosis Safe treasury wallet.
End all new founder share payments.
End all new LP share payments. We no longer should be issuing this excess Bao.
The remaining Bao from the Community fund and Bao from the Dev fund and from the LP share will be moved into the new treasury minus any amounts needed to cover an additional 2 years of current salaries which are extended through that period.
Section 7: Timelock
We’ll add a timelock to the xDAI farms to be governed by the same multisig as mainnet.
Section 8: SushiLP Tokens
Now that token minimums have been fixed on the Omnibridge, we’ll enable more SLP farms on xDAI to meet the original plan of any farm that was >$250k liquidity being transferred.
Section 9: Grants
Due to challenges with hiring we’ll begin to move to a Gitcoin grants process to encourage developers to build non-critical infrastructure for Bao.
Section 10: Voting Modification
Since Snapshot does not support multichain voting, there is an importance on ensuring a secure voting process on the mainnet as most active users move to xDAI. For this reason we should modify the existing voting power contract to include a 3x boost in voting power for locked Bao and a 50% reduction in voting power for each of LP and unstaked Bao on their current proportions.
This bill shall supersede, unbind and/or nullify all previous votes and actions in order to prevent any conflict of terms.