[BIP-6] Annual Agenda, Changes and Hard Synth Alpha

This is the proposed final version of BIP-6 that was based on the concept outlined here: The Next Path for Bao (Annual Roadmap BIP)

The concept has been significantly changed to incorporate the overwhelming feedback of the community and multiple galaxies.

Unless there are signifgant problems within this proposal, it will advance to a governance vote to be either approved or denied.

Thank you to Baowolf, Rocky, Fabiaz, Vital, Chickn and other galaxy members who provided feedback, review and English revisions, and to the many community members who took time to give detailed feedback in the initial proposal.

At the end of each year for Bao, the maintainers need to be reelect and set a forward agenda. An agenda must be then approved for them to continue forward as maintainers. Or else we must vote in other replacements.

This proposal is to make a new one year agenda and a series of large changes that the current maintainer galaxy thinks are needed for the protocol to move forward.

The main objectives of this roadmap are:

  • Improve and formalize our processes for contributions so we can expand involvement in the DAO.

  • Increase the level of decentralizaton at all parts of the decision making process.

  • Create formal processes for roles within the DAO including limiting and decentralizing their powers and creating a balance of powers that means no DAO member can ever exercise centralized authority.

  • Add clarity to existing processes that have not been formalized.

  • Create formal treasury operations for better budgeting and long term planning.

  • Provide the DAO with more time to continue to refine the economic models of the ecosystem.

  • Approve the testing of Hard Synths to move forward on our product goals.

We believe that with this roadmap that over the next year we will create a Bao protocol that is more decentralized, stronger economically, strong against governance attacks, and fair to all participants in the ecosystem.

Below are the specific points that will be approved with this vote and what we hope to implement and achieve with your approval.

1) Reapprove Maintainer Galaxy:

Reapprove the maintainers for a period of one year ending December 31st, 2022.

BaoMan will take a $0 salary from the galaxy until hard synths are launched and have reached a mint volume of >$25M.

2) Authorize Mainnet Multisig and Future Governor System:

The current system on Ethereum main network uses a timelock blocker. This will now migrate any remaining contracts that use the old timelock system to the new multisig system.

It will also set authority of the multisig to deploy and authorize either the Gnosis Snapshot, Governor Alpha, Governor Bravo or another chain voting direct governance system to replace the multisig as soon as it is approved as secure and safe by the QA Galaxy and Maintainer Galaxy.

3) Unify Treasury Operations:

Bao’s treasuries are split out across multiple wallets, networks and assets and staked in multiple contracts which makes treasury operations messy.

Instead of having separate approved treasuries, this point will make all treasuries unified under the new mainnet single multisig.

It will authorize the multisig to act as the new authorized signer for treasury transactions who will need to sign off on all spending decisions.

Salaries and other approved spends can be set up using Sablier, Gnosis Safe Policies, or other Gnosis Safe compatible spending models.

It would also set the appointment of Baowolf as a Head of Treasury and Project Operations to help manage treasury budgeting, as well as the staking and liquidity of treasury assets.

Instead of voting on each spend individually the Head of the Treasury will plan an internal budget to be approved by the multisig. This budget must be approved by one member of each galaxy and is authorized to be a maximum of 1/3rd of treasury assets annual, ensuring that Bao’s protocol always has three years worth of runway.

Any spending that moves beyond this maximum would need individual votes on the spend.

Other treasury operations such as rebalancing will only require the sign off of galaxy representatives in the multisig.

The treasury may make use of any asset allocation but it will forever be prohibited from perpetuals, futures or options unless it is farming rewards on those in a neutral strategy. This section may not be overturned by future voting in order to keep secure the longer term health of the treasury.

Since the multisig will now be required to have a treasury transaction be valid, this point will also grandfather in all previous treasury votes and transactions deeming them as valid even though they were not executed through the multisig.

Once assets are in the multisig anyone will be able to use onchain tools like Zapper to see the treasury balances live time.

4) Adjustments to Unlocking:

With much of the community having concerns in the first concept proposal it is obvious the community has not reached yet a clear consensus on a large adjustment to the unlocking. With not yet enough information around the revised unlock process for the community to feel comfortable with such a big change.

This revised proposal point will instead make the change smaller to start:

  • Push back the current first unlock day until both hard synths and veBAO have been live for a minimum of 6 months.

This gives all of our community more time to:

  • Work on a specific model for veBAO.
  • See the results of veBAO and hard synths.

If in that time those changes have been effective for the protocol then we can continue with the unlock.

If they have other issues, we continue to have time to plan changes, better understand how they are making impacts and make clear communications on them.

5) Ending Mainnet Farming of Current Pools:

This point will authorize the multisig to end the current mainnet farms which are still dripping out Bao without cause and reserve these rewards for future hard synth pools.

To do this we will create a ‘meta pool’ which will reward a test token and set it to a high number of points in the system. That test token will be held by the multisig. This will allow the remaining Bao rewards to flow into the multisig to be put into new vaults when hard synths are ready.

This will NOT apply to the Bao pools that continue to provide Bao with some basic liquidity. The rewards from these pools will be adjusted to try and maintain roughly their current reward levels within this switch.

6) Begin a Hard Synth Test on Mainnet:

The basic version of hard synths is close to being ready for testing.

At this time it won’t include LP tokens or other staked assets, due to the recent CREAM hack that dealt with oracle issues with these assets there is a lot of risk to assess as similar attacks can be made on most systems that have collateral or debt tracking.

This point will authorize the galaxy members and multisig to deploy a hard synth test that is part of the Bao Ecosystem and allocate a portion of Bao farming rewards to this test.

The test is expected to be ready and live this month and needs this approval to allocate rewards. It will also be capped to make lower risk.

*Image is a prototype values and assets should not be considered real or final. This is also just a testing design with post edits. The frontend galaxy is working to integrate these features into our existing front end and the design will change a lot before launch. Tests are local chains with fake values. Minor testing has also been done on Matic but the alpha launch will be on mainnet.

7) Authorize Multisig Members in Snapshot:

With our new BIP flow proposals need to be elevated to Snapshot for voting.

Once we are on a governor system any member who has enough tokens can do this, but due to snapshot limitations right now only authorized members can promote a BIP to a vote and right now the only authorized member of the snapshot space is BaoMan.

To make this more decentral this point will now authorize all multisig members to add a BIP to a vote.

8) Governance and Administration Process Clarity:

In the discussion around the changes to unlock there was a lot of argument around how past actions (setting variables in contract) or past votes should make an impact to what the protocol can or cannot change.

Some have argued that the unlock times are not valid because they were set by BaoMan when initially designing the contracts and didn’t have a vote.

Others have said that because we set those variables before voting, they are things that cannot be changed.

This point is to add concrete clarity that Bao is a living protocol, it is entirely governed by its users. The users have full governance power to change anything at any time and this has been said from the very start.

It should be clear that:

  • A) Previous votes, decisions, deployments and transactions are grandfathered in even if they were outside of new processes that have more decentralization such as the BIP process or multisig.

Any change of our process will not break actions on old governance models, make them invalid or result in us being unable to use them or force us to change them.

For example, when we shift to a governor system it will not mean that any votes done on Snapshot have to be redone or are invalid because they were on an old governance system.

  • B) If our new agenda conflicts with old decisions (example: unlocking time) then the clauses in this vote overrule those old decisions.

Just because something has been previously set (like unlock blocks) does not mean it can’t be over turned by new votes or new decisions.

The community will always have the ability to vote to change and overrule any part of the protocol unless they have already voted on making something specifically unchangeable.

These concepts have been informal in the community so far but this clause makes them formal. It is a one time point that makes a core piece of this protocol and will be considered to automatically apply to all future votes.

9) Fairness in veBAO:

In order to ensure that any shift to a future planned veBAO model does not unfairly benefit any members of the Maintainer team who is planning those economics, any gains from BaoMan’s locked founder share of locked Bao will be directed to the dev treasury multisig instead.

This means any rewards from veBAO to the Maintainer would come through approval of the Treasury budget and approval from Council of Guardians.

This prevents the risk of any Maintainer designing a reward system that would be bias towards them.

10) Formation of the Council of Guardians:

In an upcoming process to expand formal operations of the DAO we are creating two distinct roles in galaxies.

“Contributors” (part-time contributors and volunteers) and “Guardians” (full time individuals paid by the DAO to focus on the protocol).

Each Galaxy also has a Lead Guardian who is responsible for managing that Galaxy, setting its roadmap, reporting on the Galaxy and ensuring it hits its goals.

Each Galaxy will internally elect or appoint one of their Guardians to sit on a “Council of Guardians” which will consist of one representative from each permeant Galaxy.

Decisions that are not put to a public DAO vote, such as treasury breakdowns, or anything that needs sign-off from each of the Galaxies for approval shall use the Council of Guardians as a proxy.

11) Internal Voting:

To ensure decentralization on any matter that is not subject to a full public vote, this process will create an internal voting method to ensure that no individual can wield influence over the ecosystem even as a perceived leader.

These votes would be rare, but would consist of things like:

  • Disputes on internal budgeting that was already approved (i.e. revoking funds that Galaxies feel are being misused)

  • Partnerships and integrations that are required to be confidential prior to launch.

  • Urgent security matters (such as pulling assets out from staking when CREAM was exploited)

  • Removal of a Guardian for failure to perform their duties or uphold the values of the DAO.

The internal votes will consist of:

  • 1 vote representing the consensus of the Maintainer Galaxy, who should evaluate the proposal against security of the protocol, the DAO, how it impacts the product roadmap and that it is inline with the principles of the DAO and any legality.

  • 1 vote representing the Treasury, who should evaluate the proposal against any budget request, its impact on the treasury, its impact on the financial health of the protocol, and if the spend counts within existing proposals and frameworks or should have been a public vote.

  • 1 vote representing the Council of Guardians who should internally vote amongst themselves and evaluate how the proposal impacts the goals of each individual galaxy as well as the overall product roadmap.

  • 1 vote representing the Community Galaxy who with this vote is specifically tasked with representing the views and perspectives of the broader community and how they think a public vote on this matter would be represented.

For these internal votes a 3/4ths majority is needed for approval. A 2/2 split vote shall be considered to be a failure.

12) Requirement of Annual Roadmaps and Annual Election of a Maintainer Galaxy:

This point will task the maintainer galaxy with each year being required to put forward a formal roadmap that includes the main focus of their year and require them to be reelected.

Each October, any interested parties may put forward an annual proposal in a bid to be elected as the Maintainer.

On the 1st of November each proposal shall be put to a vote.

If multiple proposals pass, the successful proposals will then be placed into a single governance vote between the successful parties to finalize the election of the new Maintainer.

If the current Maintainers are the only ones to put forward a proposal and that proposal fails they will deemed to have been not reelected and they can try to put forward a new proposal, or the DAO can seek out new Maintainers.

Once approved any new Maintainer will take power on Jan 1st of the new calendar year, giving time for a graceful transition.

A maintainer proposal does not need to represent a single person but can represent a group who would be filling the role.

For the first year of this process due to the different timeline the current Maintainers will put forward their final proposal text by the 15th of November and must have it approved before the 15th of December, allowing for other proposals to still challenge it in that time. If no other proposals are successful prior to the 15th and the proposal from the current Maintainers is approved, then they shall be deemed reelected for the next calendar year.

13) Requirement of Formalizing Contribution Processes:

This point will set the goal for the community galaxy to outline, within the next 3 months a standard process for any community user to join, start or fund a galaxy, as well as to make technical contributions to the protocol so that we can increase the amount of decentralized users working on Bao.

14) Limiting Powers of the Maintainers over Galaxies and Guardians to Improve Decentralization:

Guardians once given their position by public vote (historical) or Guardian Council and multisig vote (future) will hold that position unless recalled.

Any newly elected Maintainer Galaxy may recall Guardians at the start of their leadership as long as that decision is laid out in their annual plan that is voted on.

Otherwise Guardians will only be recalled from their position by public vote, or if they violate the agreement of operating in the DAO (such as security).

The Treasury Operations will set up annual funding for the Galaxies based on the proposals of the Guardians and the review of the Maintainer Galaxy, Treasury Team and Multisig.

Once an annual budget is granted, the treasury is obligated to pay that budget through the end of the year.

The Maintainer Galaxy has the authority to remove contract permissions, treasury permissions, multisig permissions or repo permissions from any Galaxy member that is violating the agreement of the DAO or their position, or who is believed to be a security threat. But that will not halt the budget payments to that Galaxy.

To halt payments that were approved in an annual budget, must be done by public vote.

This ensures that the Maintainer Galaxy has the authority to act quickly in protecting the protocol from a security threat, but does not have the right to ‘fire’ anyone. It removes the ability for this system to be a hierarchy that does not involve public vote. If the maintainer wanted to remove any one from their role, it must be done so in their annual proposal that gets majority public approval.

This payment clause will only apply to a Galaxy’s annual funding proposal that was approved by the Treasury, and would not apply to temporary Galaxies or funding that was provided to a Galaxy for a specific project.

Both temporary Galaxies and project based funding has specific goals to hit and funding can be halted at any time if it fails to hit those goals.

Any Galaxy may be shutdown, or its members recalled and payment immediately ended by full governance vote.

15) Documenting Our Processes:

This point will task the Community Galaxy with documenting outlines of the governance and galaxy structures and decision making processes to be updated in the Bao docs for clarity.

16) Forming a Governance Galaxy:

Due to the increasing complexity of Governance process, this point will task the Bao DAO with forming a formal Governance Galaxy over the next year who shall manage the governance process, support in its documentation and focus on engaging the community and other stakeholders in each proposal to increase involvement in governance.


You’re always a good read BaoMan. I support this proposal in all of its juicy goodness!


Sad to see point 8 from the previous draft removed… I think adjusting the Max cap by a factor of 10 could play a major role in the adoption of BAO. I think there are a significant amount of people who wont take the project seriously because we do have such a large number of tokens. Perhaps this can be reintroduced in the future. Aside from that I support this proposal!

8)**Migrate Bao to new version

The Bao token max cap has too many tokens to work with the detailed math of the current veBAO contract model.
In order to adjust for this we would need to migrate to a new token contract for BAO that would perform a unit split at ratio of 10:1.
Users would have the same percentage amount of total Bao but the units would be smaller.
This may not be required as we could make changes to veBao’s contract instead but it would be ideal.


This is not gone, by pushing back the timeline this could potentially be included later on.


Very complex well-thought-out DAO proposals. Glad to see the dumplings being handled with such care. Eagerly waiting for a vote ✔️


I was fairly excited for the way we were going to handle unlocking before, but I understand. This proposal otherwise looks great.


Given the feedback and the timeline we had I did not feel confident that we could come up with an entirely new economic model details in time.

It seemed best then to push that down the road a bit to make sure we can do all such components correctly.


Very detailed proposal, looks very nice.
Love proposal 3, I remember one of the reasons the bao contracts were so expensive on mainnet was because a bunch of different addresses had to have bao sent to them. About proposal 4, what exactly defines "basic liquidity, is there some type of criterion?
Also about the unlocking business. There has been a lot of heated debate over when and how the vested bao should unlock, the fear being that a small marketcap will leave the protocol defenseless for malicious parties to manipulate governance decisions. But currently this is just speculation, and we haven’t even seen a single bao unlock yet. So why don’t we leave the unlock date as is for a short period of time? (To be specific, let’s say 2 months.) 1 month of unlock won’t kill the protocol, and depending on the results we can either: make a stronger case supported by evidence to convince more people that pushing the unlock date further back is necessary, or discard the idea and leave the unlock as is.
Also, I think that this proposal should be broken up into smaller chunks. This proposal contains a lot of different points, and it would be shame for the whole proposal to fail the vote just because of one of them.


this is very well put together and i would like much of this gone to a vote. i especially like the idea of a governance galaxy and would like to be involved in that.


I understand the need for pushing back the time lock, but it also means the goal posts have changed significantly. The investment people like me made, and the time in which we initially understood we would realise our investment return, now seems to be completely in the hands of the admins who will unlock at some random point in the future. If I had known, I probably would have invested in other projects. Hoping the rewards, when they come, are significant and worthwhile for those who invested and provided the financial input you guys needed from the start.

Not in the hands of admins, in the hands of everyone in the project. It cant be stressed enough that the project is ran by everyone here, we are all apart of it as members of the DAO. Changes and new ideas and scenarios should have been the expectation from the start since it was always stated to be a experimental project in very alpha what is needed is people who want to work towards the betterment of the project, the “admins” are just people who have shown extraordinary trustworthiness and talent so they are elevated members of the DAO given more access to the project to contribute to it.


I totally understand that, and yes, the admins (main people/founders/whatever you want to call them) are amazing - but also look at it from an investment point of view. I don’t think it’s enough to bucket that into ‘well, you knew this could be anything, and that’s what you signed up for’. That doesn’t remove accountability.

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No it doesn’t remove accountability but all you would be holding the team accountable for is doing what the community asks them to do, they don’t make the decisions we all do. The only thing they are responsible for is taking the direction the governance gives them and working towards BAO’s goal with the projects best interest in mind. You are the one accountable for your funds, you knew changes could be made yet you chose to swap for BAO or stake in the farms, you are responsible to show different paths and participate that’s the reason for getting a governance token.

Yeh but at some point you need a commitment to a path, walking that path and delivering what you agreed was at the end of that path… not changing paths when a particular path becomes a bit too uncomfortable.


As Jester pointed out we are a community run project and anyone can put forward a concept which could eventually go to a vote.
Currently, the proposals are mostly coming from galaxy members, so users who have already been contributing to Bao for quite some time. This doesn’t mean that you / the community can’t create any concepts or provide us with feedback to finalize concepts.

Next up we have acknowledged that we think the current distribution schedule would be too aggressive, and a different approach would be more suited for our protocol.

In this case there are two options

  1. We keep the current distribution as originally described, which means you vote no to the proposal which contains the distribution changes.
  2. As the maintainer galaxy proposed we make a change in the distribution, which will be finalized during the 6-month pushback, and you will vote yes.

In any case we expect input from the community, if we don’t get feedback then it’s easy to criticize the proposal without giving alternatives. When you don’t agree it is off course fine to voice your opinion, but don’t expect changes without input and just vote against the proposal.

Having said that the documents state that this not an investment / product for speculation.
In the end it’s always very tough to please everyone. So we put forward the concept we think is best suited for the protocol, this doesn’t necessarily align with all of our users, but we hope it does for the majority.


Thanks for the very detailed write up BaoMan,
Several amazing points which could be broken up into several votes IMO.

The more I read about decentralized projects the more I see how beneficial a State government could benefit from smart contracts and direct community votes.

Again, thanks for ensuring decentralization takes place here at Bao’s DAO!


As far as increasing involvement in governance goes, due to how few members of the community have enough tokens to submit a proposal or to have any significant impact on the outcome of a vote they are unlikely to participate. I am aware of why we took a vote to implement that policy. Being flooded with so many proposals and votes that nothing gets accomplished is counterproductive but when discussing community involvement it would be foolish to discount so many members complete lack of influence as being a factor of their disinterest.

I dont think there is a requirement of tokens to get proposals submitted.

So it sounds like now after this passes our token payments are now frozen for an undetermined amount of time ie maybe after synth token has been launched and is running “smoothly”… Is there any guaranteed reward for pulling our payments or just the hope that the price will go up rather than crashing further?

In Section # 11) Internal Voting: if a vote fails due to being split, are u saying u wouldn’t act on urgent security matters such as in the example u provided? I guess the question is, what is exactly meant by a split vote is considered to be a failure?

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